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There are some research corners in computer 
engineering whose usefulness is sometimes hard to 
understand even for experienced engineers. Fault Injection 
is one of those areas. Since the day we built our very first 
Fault Injection tool we hear the same jokes: "'Why the heck 
are you injecting faults ? don't you think there are already 
enough ?". Fortunately work in fault injection has 
progressed and nowadays this is a technique used by many 
of the biggest computer manufacturers. We'll try to show 
briefly why is Fault Injection important and what's its 
practical use. 
It is common owadays to hear about computer systems 
faults in the media. The reasons can be very diverse: from 
the blackout of America Online (AOL) affecting 6-million 
users to a software fault in Ariane 5 that cost $500 billions 
to the European Space Agency (ESA). But what exactly are 
we talking about when we talk about faults ? Simplifying 
things a little bit, a fault is a phenomenon that can cause a 
deviation in an hardware or a software component from its 
intended functions [2]. 
Hardware faults that occur during system operation are 
categorized mainly by their duration. Permanent faults are 
caused by irreversible component damages due to 
exhaustion, improper manufacturing or misusage. These 
faults can only be recovered by replacing or repairing the 
faulty component. A simple example is a chip that bums in 
your network card causing it to stop working. Transient 
faults, on the other hand, are triggered by environmental 
conditions such as voltage fluctuation, electromagnetic 
interferences orradiation. These faults usually do not cause 
any lasting damage in the affected component, although 
they can cause the system to change to an erroneous state. 
According to several studies, transient faults occur much 
more frequently than permanent ones and they are also 
much more difficult to detect. In fact these faults are the 
real headache of engineers working on fault tolerance. The 
last class of Hardware faults are Intermittent faults. They 
occur due to unstable hardware or varying hardware states 
and can be repaired by replacement orredesign. 
Finally, Software faults are caused by incorrect 
specification, design or coding of a program. Every 
software ngineer knows that a software product is bug-free 
just until the next bug is found. Many of these faults can be 
latent in the code and show up only during operation, 
specially under heavy or unusual workloads and timing 
contexts or due to a phefiomenon k own as process aging [3]. The bugs 
of non-deterministic nature which are also called Heisenbugs (as 
opposite to Bohrbugs that predictably lead to failures) are the most 
difficult ones to eliminate by verification, validation or testing and 
therefore they are something the system has to live with. Curiously, 
most of the computer system faults are attributed either to Software 
faults or Permanent faults. This doesn't mean that Transient and 
Intermittent faults occur less frequently than software ones but simply 
that they are much more difficult o track. 
So, faults can have diverse origins, but after all what's the role of 
Fault Injection in this story ? The keywords are Dependability 
Validation and Software Testing. Fault injection is mostly used to 
validate fault tolerance mechanisms in computer systems. Imagine a 
computer system for the space shuttle, railway control, nuclear power 
plants, fly-by-wire, or medical life-keeping. What these systems have in 
common is that they require high-levels of dependability. The 
consequences of a fault can be disastrous in terms of human lives or 
economic losses. It is clear that such dependability requirements cannot 
be met solely by careful design, quality assurance, shielding or other 
Fault Avoidance techniques. The assumption that faults could be 
completely avoided is unrealistic and therefore the computer system 
must be able to provide the expected service in the face of faults - this is 
the purpose of Fault Tolerance (FT). 
Fault Tolerance can range from very complex to reasonably simple 
mechanisms. For example, the space shuttle uses a Module Redundancy 
a scheme where computer systems designed by different unrelated teams 
from the same specification run in parallel using the same input data. A 
device known as a voter monitors the output of the three systems 
looking for any discrepancy. If one is detected the result which got the 
majority is used while the deviating result is considered as anomalous. 
An example of a simple fault tolerance mechanism is a watchdog 
process [5] that monitors applications for execution problems and 
performs automatic restarts in case of application crashes or hungs. 
Whatever the complexity of the fault tolerance mechanisms, its first 
requirement is to have the ability to detect faults, or more precisely the 
errors caused by the faults. Parity checking is a simple example of an 
error detection mechanism. Once an error has been detected, the 
affected component has to be identified (diagnostic) and possibly 
isolated through system reconfiguration and/or other recovery actions 
preferably in an automatic and totally transparent way- not an easy task. 
When the fault tolerant mechanisms are in place and their different 
modules tested the problem of overall system testing and validation 
shows up. How to efficiently test and validate the fault tolerant system 
as a whole ? This is important both for the manufacturers and clients of 
fault tolerant systems. Manufacturers want to be able to advertise the 
level of fault tolerance of their systems and clients want critical 
equipment to be certified. But how to certify the level of dependability of
such systems? Certification agencies uch as the German TUV are 
currently facing this problem and trying to devise the most appropriate 
methodology todo so. The use of analytical modeling is very difficult as 
the mechanisms involved in the fault activation and propagation process 
are highly complex and are not completely understood in most of the 
cases. Furthermore, the simplifying assumptions usually made to make 
the analysis tractable reduces the usability of the results achieved by this 
method. 
One practical and efficient way of performing this kind of validation 
is experimentally, ou guessed it, using Fault Injection [1]. The 
principle is to insert faults in the system as close as possible to the faults 
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that can occur in the field and check how the system reacts. 
This is useful in one hand to test if the fault tolerance 
mechanisms are behaving as specified (validation) and on 
the other hand to assess the coverage of the mechanisms, 
i.e. what percentage and what kind of faults they can 
handle (evaluation). It is relatively easy to induce 
Permanent faults and check how the system behaves; it's 
just a matter of disabling a component, e.g. disconnecting 
the network card. With Transient, Intermittent and 
Software faults it is not that easy. The real problem is in 
devising the kind of faults that should be injected and 
whether they correspond to faults that can really occur. The 
hard approach to Fault Injection is to disturb the hardware 
directly. This can be done by momentaneously flipping bits 
at the chip pins, varying the power supply or even bombing 
the system/chips with heavy ions. These methods are 
believed to cause real hardware Transient faults but 
unfortunately don't give much help for Software faults. 
Furthermore, the high complexity and the very high speed 
of the processors available today makes the design of the 
special hardware required by the above approach very 
difficult, or even impossible. Another approach is to build a 
simulator of the ~stem and inject faults by bit flipping 
directly in the simulation model. This allows a fine control 
over the timing, the type of fault, and the affected 
component in the ~stem. However, it involves an enormous 
development efforl to build the simulator which is not 
compatible with time-to-market requirements of most 
companies. 
A recent approach that is being increasingly used as an 
alternative to the others is to insert the faults in the system 
using a software tool - a Software Implemented Fault 
Injector or SWIFI for short [4]. This tool is basically used to 
interrupt he execution of the critical system software and 
flip bits in different parts of the system such as the 
processor registers, the memory, or the application code. 
The advantages of this approach is its low complexity, low 
development effort, low cost (no specific hardware is 
needed) and increased portability. An additional advantage 
is that built-in mechanisms for debugging and performance 
monitoring that are current in most modern 
microprocessors can be used to emulate hardware faults 
with a great prectsion. A SWlFI tool is usually a very 
bizarre piece of software which makes use of all possible 
processor and system hooks to create an incorrect behavior 
in a controlled manner. 
Another thing that makes SWlFI different from the 
other techniques is its ability to emulate software 
(application level) faults, and this takes us to another area - 
Software Testing. Mission critical applications require 
extensive testing, specially to catch the so-called 
Heisenbugs which occur during unusual and limit 
situations. There's nothing like executing those 
applications under the adverse conditions created by a fault 
injector to force software faults to show-up [6]. 
After all Fault Injection seems to have some important 
applications. In fact, a fault injector is a tool of invaluable 
help for dependability engineers. The route can look 
tortuous, but effectively we can say that some people artificially inject 
faults in order to understand and tolerate real faults. Confused ? 
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